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As inflation rates in the United States decline, analysts are asking if there are economic reasons
to hold the rates at levels above zero.  A study of inflation’s effects on the labor market suggests
that low rates of inflation do help the economy to adjust to changes in labor supply and demand.
When inflation’s disruptive effects are balanced against this benefit, however, the labor market
justification for pursuing a positive long-term inflation goal effectively disappears.  
In most countries, reducing inflation has been a key
objective. Governments view inflation as a force that
inhibits economic growth by discouraging long-term
investment, distorting the tax structure, and undermin-
ing the financial plans of firms and households.
Although this perception of inflation clearly predomi-
nates in policy circles, some analysts have argued that
maintaining a certain amount of inflation over the long
term can improve a country’s economic performance,
largely by keeping unemployment in check.
In this edition of Current Issues, we explore this differ-
ence of views by examining the impact of inflation on the
largest market in the United States—the labor market.1
Unlike earlier researchers, we measure both the positive
effects of inflation—the flexibility it gives employers to
reallocate wages without laying off workers—and infla-
tion’s negative effects—the confusion and error it intro-
duces in the wage-setting process.2 Drawing on data from
a detailed salary survey conducted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland over a forty-one-year period, we seek
to determine whether inflation primarily enhances or
impedes the efficient functioning of the labor market.
Our analysis reveals that low levels of inflation yield
benefits that only marginally exceed costs; the costs of
higher levels of inflation clearly outweigh the benefits.
Moreover, even at low levels, inflation does not lead to
any noticeable reduction in unemployment. Thus, while
the evidence from the labor market suggests that current
low rates of inflation do not entail the same risks as high
inflation rates, it provides little justification for actively
maintaining an inflation goal above zero.
Inflation’s Costs and Benefits in the Labor Market—
In Concept
Inflation affects labor market efficiency by influencing
firms’ wage-setting practices and compensation
schemes. In economies with competitive labor, capital,
and product markets, comparable workers at equivalent
jobs will tend to be compensated similarly.3 If an
employer sets wages too low, it will lose employees; the
resulting turnover will lead to lower profits. If an
employer pays too much, it will either suffer a profit
loss or be forced to lay off workers because it will be
unable to price products competitively. Thus, any factor
that interferes with firms’ accurate wage setting can
raise unemployment, worker turnover, or company failures.
Since labor is typically a large component of compa-
nies’ costs, such widespread interference in this market
can impair the efficiency of the economy.
How Inflation Impairs Economic Efficiency:The Sand
Effect. Inflation can cause firms throughout the labor
market to err in setting wages. Such miscalculation—
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of the two-stage annual wage-setting process, when an
employer’s senior management sets the average wage
change for its workforce. 
In determining an appropriate wage change, manage-
ment considers inflation forecasts, labor market surveys,
and projections of sales and product prices.4 Using this
information, management seeks to adjust wages so that
workers are neither over- nor underpaid. As a guide in
achieving this goal, many firms try to keep their wage
changes in line with those of other employers.
Inflation can, however, skew the outcome of employ-
ers’ careful wage deliberations and undermine efforts to
achieve parity in wages across firms. The higher the infla-
tion level, the greater the uncertainty about future rates. In
such an environment, employers may easily misjudge the
change in employee living costs or their own sales perfor-
mance for the coming year. Moreover, the prevailing
uncertainty will contribute to inconsistencies in the labor
market data that influence employer calculations of aver-
age wage changes. Thus, employers that differ in their
data sources are likely to develop different perceptions of
the state of the economy and to implement diverse wage
changes. High and fluctuating inflation can also increase
wage dispersion by compelling firms in unequal eco-
nomic circumstances to make sizable salary adjustments:
while some firms will be able to keep their salaries com-
petitive, firms facing cash or other constraints may be
temporarily unable to adapt.
Even if employers anticipate and try to avoid the wage
mistakes that occur in a high-inflation environment, their
preemptive efforts will introduce other costs. For example,
firms opting to repeat the annual appraisal and wage-
adjustment exercise at midyear will incur major expendi-
tures of time and effort. In unionized companies, in the
absence of explicit cost-of-living adjustments, such modifi-
cations will require reopening negotiation. Alternatively,
companies might spend extra money gathering more
information at the beginning of the year to avoid having to
alter their wage decisions later. Whatever strategy com-
panies choose, however, they will incur inflation-induced
costs, and the economy will operate less efficiently. 
How Inflation Promotes Wage Flexibility: The Grease
Effect. Although inflation can introduce error in wage deter-
minations, it also gives employers greater freedom to adjust
wages to reflect changes in labor market supply and demand
or variations in employee performance. This benefit—the
“grease” effect—comes into play during the second stage of
the wage-setting process, when each division of a firm allo-
cates its share of the salary budget among its workers. 
During the second stage, management reapportions the
wages assigned to the various occupations within each
division. Specifically, it seeks to match the wage that each
occupation typically commands in the market. This mar-
ket wage, in turn, reflects the amount and kind of training
necessary, the rigor of the work requirements, and the
supply of workers in that occupation relative to the
demand for them. Since each of these conditions changes
over time as technology, products, demographics, and
input prices shift, the prevailing market wage for each
occupation will also fluctuate.
Inflation allows management to respond flexibly to
changes in the market wage for different occupations. It
does so by enabling firms to overcome “downward wage
rigidity”—a societal standard of fairness that essentially
bars employers from cutting good workers’ salaries.5 To
understand how inflation’s grease effect operates, con-
sider the position of a manager who must allocate a divi-
sion’s fixed salary budget among employees in two occu-
pational groups—one with skills in rising demand and the
other with skills in declining demand. In a noninflation-
ary environment, the manager who wishes to keep the
wage of the first group in line with the prevailing market
wage may be forced to lay off workers in the second
group because wage rigidity norms rule out a reduction in
dollar wages. In periods of inflation, however, there is no
need to resort to layoffs or dollar pay cuts: the manager
can instead leave the wage of the second group
unchanged or raise it by an amount less than the change in
the cost of living. While such actions are, in effect, forms
of pay reduction, they are typically not perceived as such
by most workers.6
By preventing the overpayment of workers in occupa-
tions with declining market wages, inflation allows
employers to avoid a number of less desirable alterna-
tives—laying off workers, above all, but also charging
higher prices than competitors (and thereby risking a loss
of market share) or accepting lower profits. Moreover, by
giving employers greater flexibility to adjust compensa-
tion in response to changes in labor market supply and
demand, inflation helps to transmit appropriate wage sig-
nals through the economy. Thus, individuals making
training decisions or choosing career paths will be
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Inflation allows management to respond
flexibly to changes in the market wage
for different occupations. It does so
by enabling firms to overcome
“downward wage rigidity.”encouraged to pursue occupations that offer increasing,
rather than diminishing, opportunities.
Estimates of Inflation’s Effects in the Labor Market
How do we measure the grease and sand effects we have
identified? Because inflation causes employers to mis-
calculate their salary budgets (sand), we can measure
sand by estimating how much inflation increases wage-
change disagreement among employers. Because inflation
frees employers from wage rigidity, we can measure
grease by assessing the degree to which inflation allows
occupations to have different wage changes.7 We present
our empirical estimates of the grease and sand effects in
Chart 1, drawing on our earlier studies of inflation’s
impact on firm-level wage changes (Groshen and
Schweitzer 1996, 1997). 
Grease Effect Esimates. Allowing for 1.5 percent pro-
ductivity growth (about the average over the forty-one
years represented in our data set), we find evidence that
inflation does enhance occupational wage flexibility.8
This benefit increases most rapidly at the lowest inflation
rates. The grease curve levels off as it nears its peak (at an
inflation rate of 7.5 percent), suggesting that inflation
rates of 4 to 5 percent deliver most of the possible benefits
from inflation. Interestingly, although our methods of
measuring inflation’s grease effects differ from those of
other researchers, our results are consistent with earlier
findings that a beneficial effect exists and operates most
strongly at inflation rates up to 4 or 5 percent.9
Sand Effect Estimates. Our sand effect estimates suggest
that inflation significantly increases the disparity in
employers’ average wage changes (adjusted for the skills
they employ). Because this inflation-induced sand is
detrimental to the labor market, we plot it on the negative
vertical axis in Chart 1.
If the sand effects in the labor market are considered in
isolation, the preferred inflation goal is clearly zero. For
inflation rates up to 13 percent—a range chosen to reflect
the postwar U.S. experience with inflation—we find that the
disruptive sand effects grow continuously as inflation rises.
Although the disruption increases most rapidly at the lowest
inflation rates, each increase in inflation further upsets
employers’ wage parities, suggesting that the negative
impact of inflation is unbounded.10 Our estimates are con-
sistent with those of sand effects in retail markets.11
Net Benefits Estimate.The net impact of inflation can be
determined if the grease and sand effects are measured
equally well, in the same units, and in the same market.
Our reading of the human resources literature and discus-
sions with personnel administrators convince us that
firms try to minimize upward and downward wage errors
equivalently because the costs to the firms are symmetric.
Under these conditions, a wage error will have the same
effect on workers and firms whether its source is a lack of
grease or too much sand.12
Subtracting our measure of inflation’s sand disruptions
from our measure of grease benefits yields a net benefits
curve (Chart 2). If we compare this net effect with the
pure grease effect plotted earlier, we find that benefits
decrease and the peak of the curve shifts closer to zero. 
Strikingly, at low inflation rates, the benefits observed in
Chart 1 almost disappear. Indeed, the very flat net benefits
curve near zero inflation suggests that little labor market
efficiency is lost by moving inflation closer to zero. Further-
more, we conclude that the net benefits from inflation peak
at about 2.5 percent inflation, meaning that 2.5 percent is the
highest inflation rate justifiable on the basis of labor market
efficiency.13 Thus, our results directly contradict some ana-
lysts’findings that inflation should remain above 3 percent
to promote efficiency in the labor market.
3
Beneficial (+) or disruptive (-) effect 
on wage change variationa
Chart 1
Estimates of Inflation’s Grease and Sand Effects 
on the Labor Market
Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland Community Salary Survey. See Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1997).
a Measured as the predicted effect of inflation on the standard deviation of log
wage changes.
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Inflationb
Long-run inflation in the 2 to 5 percent
range has a negligible effect
on unemployment, lowering it
by a mere 0.1 percentage point at most.At inflation levels above 7 percent, the disruptive
effects of inflation on the labor market dominate the posi-
tive effects. Even further out, at levels above 10 percent,
inflation’s negative effects will mount very rapidly. Thus,
these levels are likely to cause serious inefficiencies in the
economy.
Net Unemployment Impact. Is our finding that a
2.5 percent rate of inflation yields a very small efficiency
gain sufficient reason to pursue an inflation goal in this
range? We address this question by converting our esti-
mates of inflation’s grease and sand effects into unem-
ployment impacts. In this way, we test the argument—
advanced in particular by those who favor maintaining
inflation above a certain threshold—that inflation can
help keep unemployment in check. To calculate inflation’s
effects on unemployment, we combine our measures of
wage effects with estimates of the responsiveness of labor
demand and supply to wage changes. This exercise shows
that long-run inflation in the 2 to 5 percent range has a
negligible effect on unemployment, lowering it by a mere
0.1 percentage point at most.14
Factors That Might Prompt Policymakers
to Seek a Change in Inflation Levels
We have seen that although low levels of inflation do no
harm in the labor market, the benefits generated are too
slight to justify the pursuit of a particular inflation
objective above zero. Nevertheless, under certain cir-
cumstances, the labor market might offer guidance to
policymakers considering whether to seek a change in
inflation levels. These circumstances include the persis-
tence of very low inflation rates, fluctuations in produc-
tivity growth, and major shocks to the economy. We
note that measures of these conditions are extremely
imprecise and are available to policymakers only after
long lags, so the conditions would be difficult to iden-
tify as they occurred. Nevertheless, in principle, they
could support moving toward higher or lower inflation
levels.
Very Low Long-Term Inflation. All estimates of the
effects of inflation (including our own) assume that
firms’wage-setting practices and compensation schemes
do not evolve in response to an inflationary environment.
The implicit assumption that such changes do not occur
is the unavoidable result of limiting our analysis to the
recent past, during which time inflation was not below
3 percent for any long period.15 We produce our esti-
mates of the grease and sand effects of very low infla-
tion rates by projecting our findings over lower rates than
were observed. Although this is a reasonable strategy
(and the only one available for now), current research
cannot fully rule out better, or worse, outcomes under
very low inflation than our extrapolations suggest.
Outcomes could be better if the persistence of very low
inflation rates had the effect of relaxing wage rigidity. The
competition generated in an environment of very low rates
could pressure workers and employers to accept alternative
compensation schemes that allow year-to-year pay reduc-
tions. Although such schemes exist now—bonus and incen-
tive pay and contingent contracts are notable examples—
they would almost certainly proliferate if inflation
remained below 3 percent for long periods. Widespread use
of these pay schemes would reduce the need for grease,
making inflation less helpful than before. Indeed, prelimi-
nary evidence from our data suggests that occupational
wage flexibility has been higher in the low-inflation 1990s
than would have been expected under historical relation-
ships (Groshen and Schweitzer 1997). Thus, it is possible
that we are underestimating the wage flexibility benefits
that would accompany very low long-term inflation rates.
However, two other factors suggest that the outcome
would be worse under a very low inflation regime. First, the
only twentieth-century U.S. experience with so little grease
in the labor market was during the Great Depression of the
1930s. At that time, wage rigidity was weakened, but only at
the cost of high and long-lived unemployment. Moreover,
even under these circumstances, practices favoring
rigid wages were not eliminated permanently, and they
rebounded strongly after the Depression. 
Second, the societal standard that effectively prohibits
cutting the wages of good workers may be an immovable
one. The fact that U.S. inflation rates of 5 to 14 percent
over the 1970s and 1980s failed to elevate the minimum
acceptable raise above zero dollars (that is, the high rates
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Beneficial (+) or disruptive (-) effect 
on wage change variationa
Chart 2
Net Impact of Inflation on the Labor Market
Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland Community Salary Survey. See Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1997).
a Measured as the predicted effect of inflation on the standard deviation of log
wage changes.
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Inflationbdid not lead to widespread indexing) suggests that the zero-
dollar wage change is a firmly entrenched standard of fair-
ness. Popular acceptance of wage cuts for good workers
could prove elusive, no matter how long inflation stays low.
In sum, the persistence of inflation rates below 3 percent
could have effects on the labor market that we are unable
to capture with our projections. Nevertheless, given the
ambiguity of these effects, it is difficult to determine
whether policymakers would want to pursue or to avoid
very low inflation rates.
Productivity Growth Fluctuations. A second considera-
tion in assessing the desirability of different inflation lev-
els is productivity growth. Because productivity growth,
like inflation, injects grease and sand into wage setting,
policymakers must evaluate how advances and declines in
this variable will interact with inflation.
The difficulty of gauging general productivity growth
adds confusion (sand) in the first stage of wage setting. In
the second stage, the effect of productivity growth on dollar
wages adds grease. To understand the grease effect, suppose
that the growth of trade allowed firms to operate on a larger
scale, where average costs were lower and productivity was
higher. As firms saw their sales rise and costs drop, they
would add workers. Wages would then be bid up by the
competition for workers, and firms would be willing to pay
higher wages because labor hours were more productive
than before.16 The increase in funds targeted for wages
would give employers the opportunity to alter the relative
wages of different occupations. In this way, advances in
general productivity act like inflation, increasing
employer flexibility to adjust wages in response to market
developments.
Now, imagine that a large oil price shock occurred,
spurring so much reorganization that output stopped
growing or fell for a while. Productivity growth could no
longer ease wage rigidity, depleting the grease in the labor
market. Under these conditions, policymakers might be
justified in seeking a higher level of inflation to compen-
sate for the economy’s temporary shortage of grease. 
Thus, the need for inflation will vary with fluctuations
in productivity growth. As productivity growth strength-
ens, the amount of grease and sand in the labor market
becomes greater, reducing the benefit of adding more
inflation. Conversely, as productivity growth declines, the
amount of grease and sand in the labor market also drops,
increasing the net benefit of inflation.
Major Shocks to Occupational Markets. A third factor
affecting policymakers’ inflation preferences would be
the onset of a major shock that affected occupations dif-
ferentially. For example, suppose an abrupt hike in
imported oil prices jacked up wages and the need for
workers in occupations involved in providing domestic
energy at the same time that it reduced wages and work
opportunities in occupations in energy-intensive indus-
tries. Under these circumstances, unemployment would
be minimized if wages could change more dramatically
than usual: that is, enough to avert layoffs in shrinking
jobs and draw workers rapidly into expanding ones. Until
the adjustments were complete, the net benefits of infla-
tion would be higher than normal and peak at a higher
level. Thus, in the aftermath of shocks, allowing higher
inflation would mitigate unemployment and other painful
consequences of adjustment. 
Conclusion
Our study of the labor market confirms that inflation
has beneficial grease effects—it enables employers to
adjust wages rapidly in response to ongoing changes in
the supply of or demand for different groups of work-
ers. When we take account of inflation’s disruptive
effects on wage determination, however, we find that
the measured benefits of inflation fall sharply. Indeed,
the net benefit is very small and is exhausted at infla-
tion rates above 2.5 percent.
Although our analysis should alleviate concerns about
the risks of maintaining the present low rates of inflation,
it offers little reason to pursue a positive long-term infla-
tion goal. We identify particular circumstances that might
encourage policymakers to prefer higher or lower levels
of inflation, but we find no indication that a specific long-
run inflation target—of, say, 2 or 3 percent—would mate-
rially reduce unemployment or produce other benefits
sufficient to override inflation’s costs by a significant
margin. Thus it appears that policymakers wishing to
identify an optimal level of inflation will have to seek evi-
dence in arenas beyond the labor market.
Notes
1. Labor costs account for two-thirds of production costs in national
output.
2. The positive employment effects investigated in this article should
be distinguished from those identified by Keynesian analysts.
Keynesian theory holds that inflation can reduce short-run recession-
ary joblessness. In this article, we consider whether inflation can alle-
viate long-run unemployment over the entire business cycle.
3. Compensation includes wages, benefits, and working conditions.
For simplicity, this analysis focuses on wages because they are the
largest and most flexible component of compensation and show the
effects of inflation more clearly than benefits or working conditions.
4. In a unionized company, wage determination also involves negotia-
tion with union leaders and a long (usually three-year) time horizon.
5. The prohibition against wage cuts is embedded in the personnel
policies of most firms. Worker opposition to wage reductions
derives in part from money illusion: workers tend to focus on the
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nominal, rather than the real (inflation-adjusted), value of their
salaries. Thus, they will resist cuts in their dollar earnings more
strongly than they resist equivalent increases in the prices of what
they buy. In addition, workers oppose earnings reduction because
they must meet significant fixed-dollar expenses such as mortgage
and car loan payments. 
6. Moreover, in a union setting, higher average wage gains make it
more likely that the union will accept differential gains for different
types of workers.
7. A wide range of tests supports the validity of this identification
strategy. See Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) for a full description
of these tests.
8. The relationship between productivity growth and inflation goals
is described in Groshen and Schweitzer (1996). Our measure of pro-
ductivity growth is the percentage change in output per hour
(reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) based on pre-chain-
weighted GDP data. Since analysts differ in their forecasts of future
productivity growth, we choose the historical mean for this analysis:
from 1956 to 1996, the mean is 1.62 percent.
9. See, for example, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), Kahn
(1995), and Card and Hyslop (1996). Other economic studies
(McLaughlin 1994; Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1995) question
the existence of downward wage rigidity and, thus, the need for
grease. Our analysis convinces us that the negative results obtained
in the latter two studies reflect data quality issues, not the absence of
downward wage rigidity.
10. If the persistence of higher rates of inflation led companies to index
their wages to inflation, the sand effect would level off. However, we
do not detect strong evidence of a decline in the sand effect.
11.See, for example, Lach and Tsiddon (1992).
12.In simulations with differing labor supply and demand elastici-
ties, we find comparable unemployment effects for grease and sand
(Groshen and Schweitzer 1996, 1997).
13.If, as some analysts expect, productivity growth slows from 1.5
to 1 percent over the next decade, then more inflation would be
needed to “grease” the economy. Under these conditions, the infla-
tion rate producing the greatest net benefits would rise to 3 percent.
14. See Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) for a description of this simu-
lation exercise. The net effect identified is far smaller than the grease
effect estimates offered by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996). They
calculate that 3 percent inflation lowers the unemployment rate from
the level that obtains at 0 percent inflation by 1.7 to 2.6 percentage
points. Significantly, however, this estimate excludes the sand effect.
15.Our sample includes wage information for the 1950s, 1960s, and
early 1990s—low-inflation periods not covered in earlier studies.
But while our sample provides some evidence of the effects of infla-
tion rates of 2 to 3 percent, it offers no evidence of the effects of
inflation at 0 or 1 percent.
16.Unlike inflationary wage hikes, productivity-induced wage
increases are not eroded by corresponding increases in prices.
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